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Abstract 
The key role that animals play in our aesthetic appreciation of the natural world has 
only gradually been highlighted in discussions in environmental aesthetics. In this paper 
I make use of the phenomenological notion of ‘perceptual sense’ as developed by 
Merleau-Ponty to argue that open-ended expressive-responsive movement is the 
primary aesthetic ground for our appreciation of animals. It is through their movement 
that the array of qualities we admire in animals are manifest qua animal qualities. 
Against functionalist and formalist accounts, I defend and develop an account of 
expressive-responsive movement as the primary perceptual sense of animals. I go on to 
suggest that the primacy of movement in aesthetic appreciation of animals is also the 
primary sense of animal ‘wildness’ and that a key part of the rewilding paradigm should 
be the development of such appreciation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
My claim in this paper is that the primary perceptual sense of our encounters with 
animals is the sense of their movement through a lived environment and that the 
‘aesthetic side’ of this perceptual sense is animal wildness. Wildness, together with its 
modifications and curtailments, is the primary aesthetic sense of animal movement. The 
multitude of aesthetic qualities that animals display are manifest in and through their 
primordial wild movement. 
 
I make the case for the primacy of movement in animal aesthetics by deploying the idea 
of ‘perceptual sense’ as developed by phenomenologists, especially Merleau-Ponty 
(e.g. 2012: 314). Perceptual sense refers to the meaning of things as they unfold in 
perception, prior to conceptualisation and judgement. Perhaps surprisingly, 
phenomenological accounts have rarely looked in depth at the aesthetic aspects of 
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animal encounters in the context of ecological aesthetics.1 Environmental aestheticians 
have drawn upon phenomenological insights before, perhaps most significantly in 
Arnold Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement (Berleant, 1992), but without any detailed 
consideration of the aesthetic significance of wild animal encounters. 
Phenomenologists have developed important accounts of human-animal relations 
(Atterton et al, 2004; Oliver, 2010) and environmental philosophy (Brown and 
Toadvine, 2003; Bannon, 2016), some focussing on the work of Merleau-Ponty 
(Cataldi and Hamrick, 2007; Toadvine, 2009),  but rarely bringing to the fore the crucial 
conjunction between these two sets of concerns that comes in our aesthetic appreciation 
of animals. Others have begun to show that non-Western traditions, sometimes 
including perspectives and methods quite close to those of phenomenologists, can feed 
into an ecological aesthetics that highlights animal encounters, such as the Li and 
Ryan’s analysis of the Chinese aesthetic of Yijing that incorporates a crucial component 
of bio-empathy (Li and Ryan, 2017). Nevertheless, none of these accounts make the 
link between the primary perceptual sense of movement and aesthetic sense of wildness 
in our encounters with animals living in their natural environments.  
 
The phenomenological aesthetics with which I approach animal encounters is 
‘ecological’ in that it takes the relationships between living beings and their lived 
environments to be the opening of fields of meaning. 2  On this view, aesthetic 
appreciation is not a special kind of sense-making or perception of special qualities of 
things, but an integral aspect of all perception. Thus, animal movement as perceptual 
sense and animal wildness as aesthetic quality are two sides of the same coin. 
Ecological sense-making can be more or less immersive and holistic, and it can also 
integrate ecological knowledge, as do two models of ecological aesthetics that Berleant 
has recently contrasted (Berleant, 2016). However, the claim that perceptual sense is 
‘ecological’ here means above all that it remains open to the multitude of intersecting 
fields of meaning that living beings are continually opening up in the course of their 
lives. Our sense of the ‘whole’, and our conceptions of what it is that we are perceiving, 
thus remain open-ended and need to allow for the uncertain and unexpected. Ecological 
sense-making takes the notion of ‘meaningful relations’3 as the basis for environmental 
thought and emphasises two important features of such meaningful relations that stem 
from appreciation of the fact that living creatures are always making and remaking 
meaningful relations with one another and their natural environments: i) meaningful 
relations are ‘ecological’ because they are complex, multifarious, overlapping, 
intersecting, the result of a multiplicity of sense-makings, including, but not at all 
confined to, those of human beings; ii) meaningful relations are ‘ecological’ because 
they elicit attempts of make sense of this whole multiplicity whilst appreciating its 
‘open-ended’ temporality. The living beings making sense of one another and their 
environments are continual remaking that sense.  
 
I begin by showing that recognising the primacy of movement in the perceptual sense 
of animality does not entail closing ourselves to the manifold ways in which we 																																																								1	Important moves in this direction can be found in Luft, 2013 and Lewis, 2018.		2	See Greaves and Read 2015 for a general approach to ecological values as the result 
of ecological sense-making. 	3	See Holland, 2012 for the development of this notion as a basis for environmental 
thought and Palmer, 2010 for a similar approach directed specifically towards animal 
ethics.		
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aesthetically appreciate animals and the many qualities that they manifest. On the 
contrary, recognising the primacy of movement directs us towards the basic perceptual 
sense that keeps us open to aesthetic plurality (section 2). I go on to argue that other 
approaches to animal aesthetics, such as functionalism (section 3) and formalism 
(section 4), make sense of animal aesthetic qualities in ways that are derived from the 
basic perceptual sense of their movement. Finally, I develop the idea that the basis of 
aesthetic appreciation is the open expressive-responsive perceptual sense of animal 
movement and, furthermore, that this primary perceptual sense of animality is also the 
primordial sense of animal ‘wildness’. I make some suggestions as to how this can help 
us to understand the central significance of animals in the environmental imagination 
of rewilding (section 5).  
 
2. AESTHETIC PLURALISM AND THE PRIMACY OF MOVEMENT 
 
One important initial concern about my claim that movement is the primary basis for 
the aesthetic appreciation of animals might be that recent work in environmental and 
animal aesthetics has tended to emphasise the plurality of aesthetic responses and 
values. The plurality of aesthetic responses can be understood both in terms of what 
one appreciates and how one appreciates it (the ‘noema’ and ‘noesis’ as Husserl called 
them), and the multiple ways in which those two poles affect and shape one another. 
Pluralist accounts include Emily Brady’s (2003) ‘integrated aesthetic’, which 
emphasises the diversity of aesthetic qualities that we appreciate in nature together with 
the diversity of attitudes and faculties that are involved in appreciation, as well as 
Ronald Moore’s (2008) ‘syncretic’ account of natural beauty, which emphasises the 
various personal and historical experiences that are drawn together in our appreciation 
of natural beauty. There is ongoing debate as to the tenability of pluralism in 
environmental aesthetics. Glenn Parsons has distinguished ‘modest pluralism’, which 
admits the appropriateness of ‘science-based’, formalist and emotive responses to 
nature, so long as they are grounded in the actual qualities of the natural world, from 
‘robust pluralism’, which admits the appropriateness of a whole range of aesthetic 
experiences, including ‘cases where natural things are viewed as things they are not’ 
(Parsons, 2008: 72). Parsons himself argues that since the actuality of natural qualities 
is measured by the truth value of scientific claims, ‘science-based’ experiences will 
always be the measure of the appropriateness of aesthetics experience of nature. This 
argument also informs his treatment of animal aesthetics, as we will see below. I 
challenge the ontological assumption on which this argument is based by introducing 
the phenomenological notion of ‘perceptual sense’ as the ground of our sense of 
actuality and thus appropriateness of aesthetic experience.  
Emily Brady (2016) has more recently defended a ‘critical pluralism’ that allows space 
for imaginative and even fictional appreciation of nature, whilst remaining critically 
sensitive to the ‘actual qualities’ of the natural world. My account of animal aesthetics 
can be understood as a contribution to such a critical pluralism, which addresses more 
directly the meaning of ‘actuality’ in the case of aesthetic experience of animals.  
In animal aesthetics, those who defend beauty as a significant platform for ethical and 
political judgement tend to embrace pluralism when it comes to elaborating what 
animal beauty consists in. Ned Hettinger, for example, sets out to defend animal beauty 
as a reason for preservation without committing to any particular account of what such 
beauty consists in and embracing a plurality of accounts (Hettinger, 2010, fn. 20).  
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Significantly for my argument, Hettinger nevertheless begins his defence of animal 
beauty with some qualifying terms: ‘If natural beauty amounts to anything, it includes 
the beauty of animals, wild and free, on the move.’ (115) 
Regarding the plurality of what we aesthetically appreciate in animals, Marta Tafalla 
has helpfully suggested that we move beyond ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ towards the whole 
spectrum of aesthetic responses animals evoke:  
 
Precisely what aesthetic appreciation of animals teaches us is that 
beautiful and ugly are only two of the great diversity of aesthetic 
qualities we value in different species, and also in the different behavior 
exhibited by the same species, which can be judged as elegant, 
harmonious, joyful, playful, graceful, fierce, majestic, imposing, 
delicate, fragile, tender, colorful, monstrous, comic, mysterious, 
enigmatic, interesting, melancholic, disgusting, terrifying, sublime, and 
so on. Some of these qualities prompt different kinds of pleasure in us, 
like joy, serenity, vitality, amusement, surprise, and so on, and others 
provoke different kinds of displeasure in us, for example, sadness, fear, 
or disgust. This plurality of aesthetic qualities is the appropriate way to 
admire biodiversity, which is the very core of nature. (Tafalla, 2017) 
 
Linking the plurality of aesthetic responses to biodiversity in this way is an interesting 
strategy. Nevertheless, this view has a tendency identify each object of appreciation as 
a species-being and to draw us away from the perceptual sense of wild movement that 
is at the core of our perception of animal nature. It cognitively separates species from 
one another and from their lived environments, which is precisely what Tafalla wants 
to avoid in her argument that zoos cannot afford us a serious aesthetic appreciation of 
animals.  
 
Approaching the issue from another angle, Stephen Davies (2012) has offered a wide-
ranging analysis of the plurality of ways that we appreciate animals and the diversity 
of our historically developed aesthetic practices. Davies also wants to broaden the 
notion of the ‘aesthetic’ to include encounters that would be considered non-aesthetic 
by ‘Kantian aesthetic formalists’ on the grounds that they are either ‘too cognitively 
loaded’ or alternatively ‘too simple’ (65-66). The result is that animals are not 
necessarily appreciated on their own terms or in terms of their ‘interests and identity’. 
Davies distinguishes nine types of aesthetic response to non-human animals: Analogy 
to features liked in humans (potentially tracking ‘fitness’; likeness to baby humans and 
mammals); likeness to us (as part of the ‘constant project of reading the minds and 
characters of others’); reflection on non-human natures and appreciation of their 
adaptation to their ways of life; ‘The animal’s color, form or movement automatically 
triggers our sensory biases in a positive fashion.’; ‘We resonate to animals’ mutual 
displays, social interactions or environmental locatedness.’; environmental taste as 
indicators of environmental health, utility and disutility; rarity or unusualness (can 
enhance but not ground aesthetic appreciation); viewing animals as artworks, literally 
as God’s artworks or imaginatively as pseudo-artworks; and finally, we abstract their 
appearances from their natural contexts in order to engage aesthetically with these as 
formal, expressive, or sensory arrays (79-80). 
 
The breadth of this analysis is again helpful insofar as it begins to make clear the wide 
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range of responses and concerns that have been gathered together in the long and 
complex history of human aesthetic practices and responses to wild animals, a history 
that is of course still underway. Nevertheless, the tendency is again to obscure the 
perceptual sense that allows such an array of responses to be gathered under the heading 
of aesthetic appreciation of animals. It is movement as openness to the creature’s lived 
situation that provides the perceptual sense of animality, shaped and reshaped by the 
complex genealogies and concrete contexts of our animal encounters. Whilst Davies 
only mentions movement explicitly as the focus of some of the responses he analyses, 
my aim is not to narrow the category of ‘the aesthetic’ once more, so as the exclude 
some of this range of experiences as non-aesthetic. Rather, understanding the primacy 
of movement in animal aesthetics draws attention to the perceptual sense that runs 
through all such responses in one way or another.  
 
To begin to do this Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions help us to recover the perceptual sense 
in which the whole range of aesthetic responses unfolds. In the following passage from 
Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty nicely encapsulates the difference 
between the objects-with-properties ontology that he thinks distorts so much 
philosophising and what phenomenological analysis of experience reveals:  
 
[T]he bird that crosses my garden is, in the very moment of the movement, 
merely a grayish power of flight and, in a general way, we shall see that 
things are primarily defined by their “behavior,” and not by static 
“properties.” It is not I who recognize, in each point and in each instant 
passed through, the same bird defined by explicit properties; rather, it is the 
bird in flight that accomplishes the unity of its movement, it is the bird that 
changes place, and it is this feathery commotion still here which is already 
over there, in a sort of ubiquity, like the comet and its tail.   (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012: 288)  
Although the point is a general one, I do not think that it is an accident that a bird 
prompts this thought. Merleau-Ponty is drawing out the implications of a 
phenomenology of perception into an ontology that goes beyond the object-property 
ontology that obscures the primordial perception of the bird’s flight. That ontology also 
moves beyond what has been called the ‘Gestalt-ontology’ of his early work in the 
Structure of Behavior (Toadvine, 2009: 21). In this passage we find the inklings of what 
might be termed a ‘Gist-ontology’, that finds the being of things in their primal and 
characteristic movements.4  Animality is the intense manifestation of movement in 
perceptual sense and it is in aesthetic appreciation of animal movement that we 
appreciate them for what they are in this primal sense. 
My intention here is to demonstrate that the primacy of movement has a crucially 
aesthetic sense that can help us to address emerging debates concerning wild animals 
																																																								4 	My	 term	 ‘Gist-ontology’ alludes to one possible etymology of the term ‘jizz’, 
designating the identifying ‘basic character’ of a bird in movement and comportment. 
The term has been taken up in other fields of biology and ecology. The origins of the 
term are unknown and highly contested. One interesting possibility in this context is 
that it is a corruption of ‘Gestalt’. See McDonald, 1996 for an overview of the meaning 
and origin of the term. 	
	 6	
in environmental philosophy.5 I argue that animals appear so prominently and intensely 
in the natural world as we perceive it because their expressive-responsive movements 
draw our attention not first to the qualities and forms of their bodies, nor even to 
species-specific ‘movement signatures’, but to their unfolding relations to those around 
them and the open-ended environments they move through. Animals are self-moving, 
but never absolutely self-moving, and the aesthetic sense of their wildness is relational 
self-movement. Wild movement thus understood is not a quality amongst others that 
an animal either has or does not have, but the primary perceptual sense of animality 
itself. Wild movement is the perceptual sense that unfolds to us the whole spectrum of 
aesthetic qualities that we appreciate in animals.  
 
3. MOVEMENT, VITALITY AND PURPOSE 
 
To substantiate the claim that movement is primary to the aesthetic appreciation of 
animals it will be helpful to examine some prominent criticisms of this view. In this 
section I will look at the arguments put forward by Glenn Parsons (2007) against the 
primacy of movement and in favour his own ‘functionalist’ view. In the following 
section I will examine how formalism tries to deal with the aesthetic qualities of 
animals. In both cases movement is acknowledged as a significant aesthetic feature of 
animals, but it is thought to require grounding in a framework that understands 
movement as one aesthetic quality amongst others. In so doing these views miss both 
the specific phenomenal sense of animal movement as perceived wildness that I will go 
on to set out, but also fail to understand that it is actually this phenomenal sense that 
‘grounds’ and structures appreciation of all animal aesthetic qualities.  
 
In his survey of various possible approaches to animal aesthetics Parsons is quick to 
dismiss the movement approach.  His argument rests in part on a decontextualised 
reading of Hegel’s claim that animal animation and animal beauty are intrinsically 
linked. If we return Hegel’s claims to their context they actually turn out to have certain 
affinities with Parsons’s own ‘functionalist’ approach. Both Parsons and Hegel 
ultimately characterise animal movements as evaluable in terms of purposiveness, 
fitness or functionality, in a way that unduly restricts their phenomenological sense and 
aesthetic appreciation.  
 
Parsons cites Hegel, alongside Ruskin, as examples of what he sees as an 
anthropomorphic moralising tendency (Parsons, 2007: 157). According to this view 
animals that display greater active vitality are judged to be more beautiful, and the 
extremely inactive judged ugly. This is epitomised in Hegel’s infamous criticism of the 
sloth in the introduction to his lectures on Aesthetics: 
 
[..] the sloth displeases because of its drowsy inactivity; it drags itself 
painfully along and its whole manner of life displays its incapacity for quick 
movement and activity. For activity and mobility are precisely what 
manifest the higher ideality of life. (Hegel, 1975: 130) 																																																								5	The idea of the ‘primacy of movement’ has previously been deployed, independently 
and in different contexts, by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011) and Tim Ingold (2011). 
Whilst both accounts support what I have to say here about the primacy of movement 
in a general sense, neither focuses specifically on its implications for animal aesthetics. 	
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Without wishing to defend what does indeed seem to be a rather hasty negative 
judgement of the sloth, it is important to get clear about precisely what claim is being 
made and on what grounds. Earlier in the text Hegel has claimed that the perceptual 
basis of aesthetic appreciation of animals is their animation (124). Later, in the passage 
cited, he is concerned with the various aesthetic judgements that we make, considering 
why it is that some animals are judged more beautiful, and some less beautiful or ugly. 
The problem is that Parsons does not distinguish the claim of the primacy of movement, 
i.e., that movement is the perceptual basis of all aesthetic judgement of animals 
(positive or negative), from the claim that quick or vital movement is judged positively. 
An unconvincing assessment of how we ground positive or negative judgements in 
particular movements does not in itself invalidate the prior phenomenological claim 
that animation is the perceptual basis of aesthetic appreciation, and thus also any 
aesthetic judgement. Furthermore, it appears that Hegel himself when considering the 
positive judgement of quick and vital movement is concerned not simply with the 
quickness of the movement as such, but with the perceptual quality of that movement. 
The sloth is judged to be ugly not simply because it is slow, but because it appears to 
‘drag itself painfully along.’ That suggests that a beautiful movement showing ‘the 
higher ideality of life’ would appear effortless, like the beauty of a ballet dancer as 
compared to a weightlifter. If that is the suggestion then numerous problems will still 
arise. If animal beauty is an effortful self-movement made to seem effortless, what 
should we make of the gliding of birds on thermals, that appear as an effortful avoidance 
of effort? Or a salmon run that is impressive precisely as manifesting the supreme effort 
of a fish versus river? Those are problems for the formation of positive and negative 
judgements if beauty is restricted to effortless vitality, but their solution will involve 
more precise phenomenological analysis. They are not problems for the claim that 
movement is the perceptual basis for any appreciation, which in turn may or may not 
be used to ground positive or negative judgements.  
 
If we return Hegel’s problematic judgement to its original context, 6 his understanding 
of the importance of movement in animal aesthetics brings him closer to Parsons’s own 
preferred ‘functionalist’ view than one might expect. The section of Hegel’s text on 
‘Life in Nature as Beautiful’ begins with the claim that the first thing to strike us about 
living beings in nature is their capricious movement. Closer inspection reveals living 
movement to involve an inner purposiveness (i.e. vital needs and desires) and a third 
look, or rather thought, begins to understand the system of nature that has brought about 
that inner purposiveness (Hegel 1975: 124).  
 																																																								6	Recent work in Hegel scholarship has shed significant light on the opening sections 
of the Lectures on Aesthetics that deal with natural beauty, showing how they fit into 
Hegel’s dialectic as a whole and their importance for animal aesthetics. Julia Peters 
(2015: 18-27) highlights the role of the concept of habit, as it is developed in Hegel’s 
anthropology, for understanding his claims about the superior beauty of human over 
animal bodies. Michael Lewis (2018) focuses on the various grounds for judging 
animals to be ugly that Hegel avers and situates these in relation to the key notion of 
the ‘bad infinite’ that informs Hegel’s thinking of nature. Both of these scholars make 
clear the importance of unity, subjectivity and autonomy as informing Hegel’s 
aesthetic ideal, which can be contrasted with the aesthetic ground of wild ‘perceptual 
sense’ that I am advocating here.		
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It is these second and third takes on living movement that bring Hegel very close to the 
‘functionalist’ view. When vital needs and desires are explained in terms of their 
function in the ‘system of nature’ they are understood as emergent functions within that 
system. Parsons thinks that the evolutionary concept of ‘fitness’ can ground perceived 
purposiveness. A tension between fitness as an explanatory concept and manifest 
functionality then arises in Parsons’s own key example of animal beauty arising from 
perceived ‘fitness’:  
 
Take the cheetah, a creature whose body, like that of the racehorse, appears 
“built for speed.” Virtually every feature or part of the cheetah is manifestly 
geared to that end: its long legs bespeak a formidable stride, its non-
retractable claws reveal its gripping and steering ability, its narrow body 
and small head bespeak an aerodynamic movement, and so forth. This 
manifest fitness gives the cheetah’s appearance a certain pleasing visual 
quality: it “looks fit.” A similar account could be given for the appearance 
of many animal features, from the broad wingspan of a gliding raptor to the 
dexterous lankiness of a tree frog’s toes.   
(Parsons, 2007: 162) 
Any manifest functionality on this list of bodily features has as its assumed background 
the famed speed of the cheetah in the chase, which many people have witnessed on TV 
and film footage, even if they have not seen it first hand. However, all of the features 
listed here could well be noted in a photograph, drawing or taxidermy specimen. It is 
only insofar as footage, photograph, drawing or specimen are able to give a sense of 
the lived movement of a hunting cheetah that the functionality becomes manifest in any 
of these cases, otherwise the features can be noted and explained as functional elements, 
but are not perceptually manifest as such. The assumed background to which each 
feature points is the manifest movement of a cheetah as it gingerly stalks through the 
high grass; as it begins to lope towards its chosen prey still assessing whether to abort; 
as it reaches its full stretch and must then turn vertiginously as its prey turns. The lived 
movement is what is aesthetically appreciated, moving from subtle shifts, to awkward 
wariness, to utterly absorbed speed. The understanding of the bodily features that make 
it possible is aesthetic appreciation of the animal only insofar is it points us back to that 
assumed background.   
 
We must question whether the manifest lived movement that is aesthetically 
appreciated is best described in terms of ‘fitness.’ As Parsons implies, there is a clear 
purposiveness in the chase that manifests the ‘inner purposiveness’ of need and desire. 
If ‘fitness’ is the ability to successfully fulfil purpose, then one might wonder whether 
there is more to be appreciated in a chase that results in a successful kill. That seems 
unlikely, as does the correlative thought that aesthetic appreciation shifts from the 
cheetah’s movement to the prey’s movement if the hunt fails. The fact that the majority 
of chases in wildlife documentaries result in a kill need not lead us to think that there 
is more to be aesthetically appreciated here, but perhaps only that prejudices in favour 
of a certain idea of the chase coming to fulfilment overlay its primary perceptual sense, 
prejudices that may need to be overcome.7  																																																								7	The BBC’s 2015 documentary The Hunt explicitly sets out to correct this usual 
emphasis on the kill: ‘the kill itself isn’t interesting, because once animals have killed, 
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The move to ‘adaptive’ fitness brings out the tension between Parsons’s idea of 
‘looking fit’ and the evolutionary-ecological concept of fitness. It is quite possible for 
the cheetah to ‘look fit’ in the sense of manifesting purposive speed and precisely for 
that reason to be ecologically ‘unfit’ because its speed adaptations mean that it occupies 
a narrow niche that may be closed off, e.g. its range of possible prey is narrow. Fitness 
in the sense of ecological and evolutionary science is a statistical function of a 
population-in-environment and is often divorced from ‘looking fit,’ both because of the 
prejudices such a look can harbour and because of the unexpected vicissitudes an 
environment can throw at a population. 8   
 
Whether all animal movement has such manifest purposiveness is also questionable. 
We can attempt to explain play of all kinds as adaptive, but whether or not those 
attempts are convincing, the very open-ended expressive-responsive movements of 
play do not primarily manifest as functionality. Yet they are prime occasions for 
aesthetic appreciation, both on our part and often on the part of the animals themselves. 
 
The primary perceptual and aesthetic sense of animal movement is neither pure 
capriciousness nor determinate understanding of the system of nature. Perception of 
animal movement begins with the middle term, as Merleau-Ponty might say, from 
which senseless capricious movement and explanatory understanding are both 
abstractions. For an ecologically aesthetic appreciation of animals, ‘inner 
purposiveness’ must be broadened to an appreciation of the interactive movements of 
animals amongst others and moving through their environments.   
 
For Hegel, the system of nature produces higher and higher manifestations of a concrete 
activity that begins in ‘inanimate’ nature: 
 
In a still higher, more concrete, way a similar activity of immanent 
formation [to the formation of crystals] is displayed in the living organism, 
and its outline, shape of limbs, and above all its movement and expression 
of feelings. (Hegel, 1975: 130) 
 
																																																								
the story’s over. What is interesting is the build up, the strategies adopted by both the 
predators and prey.’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/57m0bYByVs3JFCw1XJbWgGy/introduc
tion-to-the-hunt (accessed 1 Sept 2017) 
 
8 Parsons and Allen Carlson return to the cheetah example in their jointly authored 
book Functional Beauty (2008). There they explain that ‘looking fit’ in the sense they 
intend can involve knowledge of function or fitness becoming part of perception. This 
is certainly a point that I would concede, following Merleau-Ponty’s thought that 
intellectual understanding can become ‘sedimented’ in perceptual sense. However, the 
tension that I highlight between fitness as explanatory concept and fitness as manifest 
function is still present. Furthermore, they add that ‘”looking fit” is not the only form 
of Functional Beauty applicable to animals’ and that natural selection often shapes 
traits to have functions that do not ‘look fit’ (120, fn 23), highlighting the fact that 
scientific understanding of fitness can still diverge from perception at crucial points.  
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This formulation takes us to the next attempt to incorporate the perceptual sense of 
animal movement into a purportedly broader framework that I address in the following 
section, that is, formalism that takes movement to be one set of formal qualities that 
animals possess, along with outline and shape of limbs, amongst others. I then take up 
Emily Brady’s suggestion that we appreciate animals for their expressive qualities, and 
develop my own claim that such expression is not one set of qualities amongst others 
but integral to the concrete phenomenal sense of expressive-responsive movement, 
which in turn is the primary source of aesthetic qualities qua animal qualities. This 
perceptual sense of animality, I will argue, is ultimately also the primordial sense of 
animal ‘wildness.’  
 
 
4. MOVEMENT, FORM AND STILLNESS 
 
Formalist approaches to animal aesthetics treat movement as one set of formal qualities 
amongst others and question the need to privilege one set of such qualities. My response 
to this kind of approach is that it is only under certain conditions that abstract from their 
original perceptual and aesthetic sense that animal movements can be so regarded. As 
originally perceived it is in and through animal movement that aesthetic qualities are 
manifest and only then can they be formally analysed. I will distinguish two elements 
of the process of abstraction: the abstraction of forms and the abstraction of sense.  
 
The abstraction of forms is what allows formalists to identify different ‘formal 
qualities’ and to consider them as separate, or at least ideally separable. Stephen Davies, 
as we saw in section 2, lists as formal qualities ‘colour’, ‘shape’ and ‘movement’, 
noting such formalism is only one kind of appreciation that requires abstraction from 
the lived perception of animals in their environments. We can see that this approach 
relies on abstraction through separation. Contrast this to Merleau-Ponty’s description 
of the bird as a ‘greyish power of flight’. The greyishness is not amalgamated with the 
power of flight, but is a quality manifest in the power of flight. In the animal world 
outlines, shapes, colours and calls are not simply set before us in various combinations, 
they are manifest in display, ritual, chase, escape, and all manner of movement. The 
flash of white under the wing of a greyish power of flight is not a formal property only 
now revealed, but a further unfolding of that very movement.  
 
The abstraction of forms need not be the result of explicit processing of experience. 
Even the descriptions of Gestalt psychologists and others who focus on situated 
perception can betray formalisation. In an analysis of what he describes as J.J.Gibson’s 
‘ecological phenomenology’ Claude Romano recalls Gibson’s critique of the tendency 
in Gestalt psychology to consider dynamic structures of perception as conforming to 
formal structures. For Gibson, Romano argues, ‘perception is not first perception of 
invariable forms, but of informal invariants’ (Romano, 2016: 164). Such invariants 
arise in the dynamic and originally formless movements through which animals 
respond to the affordances of their environments. As I conceive of it, ecological 
aesthetic appreciation of animals in their lived environments involves the perception of 
their dynamic movements and the informal invariants that are manifest in them. Take 
the mating display of Great Crested Grebes, during which each stands up in the water 
and presents weed to its partner shaking its head. This movement greatly increases its 
‘height’ above the water as its stands, whilst its bill becomes an invariant of length 
extending towards its partner now that the presentation cannot be made with the 
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extension of the neck. In other movements of the display the bill and neck, and even 
the whole length of the body, are extended toward the other and are thus not seen as 
separate lengths. The movements of the two birds together are dynamic expressive-
responses to one another and their environment. This is not a complex amalgam, but an 
experience all at once of the animals’ lived movement as a dynamic exchange of variant 
and invariant, not only in bodily lengths, but expression and response in relation to one 
another, the weed and the water. The dynamic invariants in the case of perception of 
animal movement are manifest in the course of the movement that opens the 
environment to the birds, and in my appreciation of their movement it also reveals that 
environment to me. The abstraction of form separates invariants from the movements 
in which they become manifest, but also begins the process of closing down the overall 
perceptual sense of movement through an environment. 
 
That further process, which I call the ‘abstraction of sense,’ is intimately related to the 
first. Formal qualities are more easily separated if their overall sense is extracted from 
their lived context and the open character of animal movement is curtailed. A prominent 
exponent of formalism, Nick Zangwill, goes so far as to claim that the surprisingly 
dainty formal quality of a polar bear’s swimming that he sees from underneath in a tank 
at the zoo would not be affected if it transpired that this were in fact a man in a polar 
bear suit (Zangwill, 2001: 214). Glenn Parsons dismisses this peculiar judgement with 
the same haste that he dismisses Hegel’s judgement of the ugliness of the sloth 
(Parsons, 2007: 160). A phenomenological analysis of the apparent grounds for such 
an unlikely claim can be more revealing and shed light on what occurs in formalist 
abstractions. Perhaps the bear’s swimming is thought ‘surprisingly’ dainty in mental 
comparison with its lumbering gait on land, recalled from another zoo enclosure or 
television images. The sense of this experience is thus revealed as a collaged amalgam 
of contrasting snippets of movement. It would be quite different, I think, if one were 
able to lumber along with the bear and then plunge into the water and swim alongside 
it. Or even to observe it from a kayak as it lolloped towards a break in the ice and then 
took the plunge. The contrast between run and swim might still be there, but as a 
modulation of a continuous movement with its own sense as the bear moves from ice 
to water. It is only the situation of delimited movement, inviting a collaging of sense, 
that makes the formalist claim regarding the man in the suit scenario even vaguely 
plausible. Of course, such situations are not at all uncommon, and they may well even 
be the majority of situations in which animal movement is now encountered. But that 
frequency does not allow the formal abstraction of sense to overcome the primacy of 
real embodied movement through an environment, upon which it still depends for 
whatever abstracted sense it possesses. We should take careful note of the fact that the 
‘abstractions’ that allow for formalist separation of qualities and curtailing of overall 
perceptual sense are not simply ‘armchair’ cognitive or imaginative operations. They 
involve the cultivation of specific perceptual habits in particular kinds of media 
representation and also the actual extraction of animals from their lived environments, 
as in the case of this polar bear.9  
 
In sum, my claim against formalism rests on a phenomenological analysis of form as 
the result of specific perceptual habits and practices that curtail or contain the open 																																																								9 	These considerations should add further weight to Marta Tafalla’s powerful 
arguments against the possibility of serious aesthetic appreciation of animals in zoos 
(Tafalla 2017).	
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unfolding of the perceptual sense of animal movements. I agree to a certain extent with 
general anti-formalist arguments, such as those proposed by Parsons and Carlson, that 
hinge on the claim that engagement is the appropriate way to appreciate nature 
aesthetically and that ‘framing’ produces forms that involve artificial imposition (e.g. 
Parsons and Carlson, 2004). The difference is that a focus on the perceptual sense of 
movement reveals it as primarily open-ended, incomplete, lived or ‘wild’ sense-making 
in which the animal expressively responds to its environment, and it is perceptual 
engagement with that primary sense of movement that reveals that animal and its world 
to me for appreciation. It is in cultivating awareness of the perceptual sense of their 
movements that we aesthetically appreciate animals. Formalist abstractions ultimately 
also rely on awareness of this sense, even as it is contained and curtailed, since 
‘framing’ is not necessarily entirely arbitrary. I do not, for example, draw an imaginary 
vertical line down the centre of the polar bear’s body as it swims and try to perceive the 
left and right limbs as working independently from one another. The attempt would 
surely be only of very limited success, and insofar as it succeeded, the ‘daintiness’ that 
so impressed Zangwill would be obliterated.  
 
One might object at this stage that form is what we appreciate in animals that are still, 
and the fact that stillness does not prevent aesthetic appreciation tells against the whole 
idea of the primacy of movement. My response to such claims is that stillness and 
movement are not separable moments of animal lives. We will see in the next section 
that anticipation or the ‘imminence’ of movement is crucial to its wild perceptual sense.  
 
Stillness isn’t simply the shadow of actual movement, but rather it is an integral 
anticipation of movement itself, and vice versa.  Stillness and movement are not 
perceived and aesthetically appreciated as potential and actuality, as some of have 
argued in response to this concern (e.g. Rolston III, 1987: 188).  Martin Heidegger 
makes this point in his close reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics B by distinguishing 
movement from what he calls ‘movedness’ as the principle of nature. Movement and 
stillness together manifest fundamental ‘movedness’: ‘The purest manifestation of the 
essence of movedness is to be found where rest does not mean the breaking off and 
cessation of movement, but rather where movedness is gathered up into standing still, 
and where this ingathering, far from excluding movedness, includes and for the first 
time discloses it.’ (Heidegger, 1998: 217). The movement of wild animals preeminently 
manifests the integration of movement and ‘standing still’. To take up an example that 
Heidegger suggests without drawing out this particular implication, a bird of prey 
circling above the forest is moving and still within itself (212). The perceptual sense of 
each movement includes the stillness from which it unfolds and returns to stillness, and 
the sense of stillness includes the movement that is gathered up into it, which it has 
arrived from and where it can go from here.  Each movement is an actual manifestation 
that at the same time has gathered within it immanent stillness, not as mere possibilities 
of what might happen next, but as the sense of what is unfolding. The aesthetic 
appreciation of animal movements is also, in each case, an appreciation of the lived 
environment that animals move through and stand within. The resting moth rests 
differently on a garden wall in the evening to one on the bedroom wall after a night 
hurling itself at the lightbulb. The poised spider with several wrapped flies in its web 
has a different poise to one with nothing but fresh dew festooning its trap. The stick 
insect that stands still for all the time I observe it, stands in a stillness with a field of 
movements gathered into it, quite different to the sticks that surround it once I am able 
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to see it as such.  
5. WILDNESS AS EXPRESSIVE-RESPONSIVE ANIMAL MOVEMENT 
 
I now want to develop the idea that ‘wildness’ in this context should not be understood 
as one possible feature of animals amongst others, but essentially linked to the open 
movements that are primary to perceptual and aesthetic appreciation of animals as such. 
Animal wildness is the open expressive-responsiveness of animal movements through 
their lived environments.  
 
Certainly, there are many senses in which animals are said to be wild, senses which can 
interweave and even pull against one another in complex ways. Clare Palmer, for 
example, has analysed three senses of animal ‘wildness’ (2010: 64). ‘Constitutive 
wildness’ contrasts the wild with the domesticated, often, but not always, focussing on 
the intentional influence that human activity has on the genetic structure of animals. 
‘Locational wildness’ contrasts the wild with the urban, designating animals as more or 
less wild according the degree of wildness assigned to their location. ‘Behavioural 
wildness’ contrasts with tameness, tending to focus on aggression or fear towards 
humans as characteristically ‘wild’ behaviours. Palmer emphasises that each of these 
senses of wildness forms a spectrum rather than dichotomy, and that they do not always 
map onto one another neatly.  
 
The sense of wildness that I have in mind is not any one of these specific categories. 
Each of Palmer’s spectra ranges primarily over the properties or characteristics 
discerned in individual animals viewed as specific intentional objects. Instead, when I 
refer to ‘wildness’ here I have in mind what Merleau-Ponty refers to in notes towards 
his last work The Visible and the Invisible as ‘wild being’ (1968: esp.167-170). 
Wildness in this sense is the correlate of the primary layer of perceptual sense that I 
have highlighted. It is wildness of both perception and perceived, intimated in the open-
ended multi-dimensional dynamics of the perceptual world. It is my contention, 
although I am unable to fully substantiate this claim here, that all the categories of 
wildness draw their sense from primordial wild being that Merleau-Ponty equates with 
the perceived world (170). To give an indication of what I mean: constitutive wildness 
refers not simply to the lack of intentional human influence on the constitution of an 
animal, but the concomitant open expression and responsiveness of the animal’s 
embodied motility that has not been made to ‘fit’ with human desires and expectations. 
Behavioural wildness, even in cases where it is bred into an animal, similarly refers 
back to open-ended uncertainly of fit between human and animal as each make sense 
of the world they find themselves in. Locational wildness refers to the relatively intense 
multi-dimensionality and uncertainty, from one’s own current perspective, of 
ecological sense-making in some locations relative to others. None of these categories 
is precise or absolute, precisely because they gain their sense by referring back to the 
open-ended and uncertain perceptual sense of wild being.   
 
As Merleau-Ponty understands it ‘wild being’ is not eradicated or replaced by 
categories that aim to give us a completed and thus ‘tamed’ vision of the world, a vision 
that goes along with the idea that the perceptual world is the result of discrete ‘acts’ of 
human consciousness. Rather, wild being remains the latent, embodied and mobile, 
ground of sense, the ‘imperception’ in perception, that remains ignorant of itself in 
categorisation and the analysis of perception into discrete intentional acts (213).   
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Understood in this way, we can see why animals play such a key role both in Merleau-
Ponty’s elaboration of the wild being of the perceptual world and in the contemporary 
aesthetic imagination of rewilding. Thinking of animal wildness in this way avoids an 
idealised notion of complete absence of all human encounter, as well as the idea that 
wildness is a single quality or property that each animal either possesses or lacks. 
Wildness as open and uncertain temporality is manifest preeminently in the open 
expressive-responsive movements of animals through their environments. As such it is 
not a quality simply present or lacking, but the very being of animals as relative 
intensity of the dynamic movement of wild being, through which animal qualities, 
amongst all natural qualities, become manifest.  
 
The notion of wildness has received renewed attention in recent debates due to the 
emergence of ‘rewilding’ as a new paradigm in ecological restoration. The rewilding 
paradigm shifts the temporality of ‘restoration’ away from an imagined pristine past 
towards an imagined future in which nature is set (at least relatively) free from strict 
managerial regimes to manifest itself in potentially unexpected and even unimagined 
ways (Prior and Brady, 2017). It paradoxically rests on the imagining of an open, 
unseen or unimagined future, adding a temporal dimension to the paradox of wildness 
identified by Martin Drenthen (2005) as the spaces outside of culture that are 
continually appropriated as such back into culture.  
 
Uncertainty and the unexpected are central to the notion of wildness. Furthermore, the 
‘reintroduction’ of wild animals, often apex predators or other ‘charismatic megafauna’ 
looms large on the rewilding agenda. Prior and Brady (2017) therefore suggest that the 
aesthetic result is likely to be further encounters with ‘terrible beauty’ in the form of 
predation, and other potentially uncomfortable aesthetic experiences, such as 
encounters with disease. I think that there are even closer connections between the sense 
of wildness and animal encounters, that suggest why ‘releasing’ animals into the wild 
and allowing them to return of their own accord is such a central part of the rewilding 
agenda. That is because the perceptual sense of an open and uncertain future is 
generated most intensely and directly in animal encounters, when we follow along with 
their expressive-responsive movements through their lived environments. Rewilding 
should therefore be understood as in large part an aesthetic project in which specific 
practices of ecological restoration work alongside a ‘rewilding of experience’ in which 
we cultivate appreciation of wildness, especially manifest as the multitude of 
expressive-responsive animal movements.  
 
The analysis of the primacy of movement in animal aesthetics that I have provided can 
help us to understand how various aspects of this notion of wildness fit together, and 
why wild animals loom so large in the environmental imagination of rewilding.  
 
Emily Brady (2014) has herself provided some further clues in the course of an 
argument that expressivism has been a neglected alternative in animal aesthetics. One 
might at first think that the significance of animal emotional expression is an alternative 
approach to my own, but that would be a mistake, as Brady’s own examples tend to 
show. Brady helpfully points out the limits of ‘resemblance theories’ that try to account 
for the appreciation of animal expression through their resemblance to familiar and 
typically human expressive behaviour. She also makes important links between 
appreciation of expressive behaviour and the symbolic characterisation of animals. 
	 15	
When it comes to ‘literal expression’ she suggests that such expressions are the outward 
expression of ‘mental states’ and have generally been neglected by aestheticians and 
left to psychology and behavioural studies. Taking up an example from R.G. 
Collingwood that was also used by Parsons to exclude ‘sympathetic response’ from 
aesthetic appreciation, she argues that the bright eyes of animals are genuine occasions 
for aesthetic appreciation:  
 
We can and do make aesthetic judgements which distinguish between 
dull, insipid or tired eyes and, say, the poise and narrowed eyes of a wild 
cat about to pounce. We may find the appearance of those eyes 
interesting for their expression of vitality and expectant look- and 
perhaps also for the thrilling pounce that we expect to follow from that 
look. (197)  
 
The significance of this example is that it recontextualises the appreciation of bright 
eyes in an encounter with an animal living in its environment through the expressive-
responsive movement of its whole being. The bright eyes are not admired as isolated 
jewel-like objects, but manifest their specific brightness as an intrinsic part of the poise, 
the ‘ingathering’, of the cat about to pounce. The bright eyes may indicate health, as 
Brady goes on to note, but there again the aesthetic appreciation of such an indication 
comes in this context of wild, expressive-responsive, movement, not as one item on a 
checklist of health indicators in a veterinary examination.  
 
Expectation plays a key role in the appreciation of this wild movement, which can seem 
paradoxical if we conceive of wildness in terms of the uncertain and unexpected. In 
fact, expectation and the unexpected are intrinsically bound together in these 
experiences. There can be nothing unexpected if the movement itself does not inculcate 
expectations which may then be fulfilled, confounded, or more or less subtly modified. 
In his lectures on Nature Merleau-Ponty calls this expectation that he earlier described 
in the movement of the ‘greyish power of flight’ the ‘imminence’ of perceived 
movement: ‘This is not only an already made trajectory, nor even a trajectory that will 
be, but a trajectory that is going to follow. It is the grasp of the imminence of what is 
going to follow in what has already begun.’ (2003, 154). This is the imminence of the 
wild cat’s pounce in its poise with narrowed bright eyes. At the same time, the 
imminence of what is going to follow can take quite unexpected turns as it is followed 
through. Unexpected both for the moving animal and for those following along with it. 
The animal expresses itself and responds to others as it does so. Perhaps it catches wind 
of me watching just as it is about to pounce and flees. Wildness involves the generation 
of open expectations and uncertain indeterminate imminence.  
 
It is for this reason that I insist that expressive movement is always at the same time 
responsive. Furthermore, the idea of animal expression needs to leave room for the 
indeterminacy and openness of wild movements that are expressive. Rather than the 
representationalist notion that expressions are outward manifestations of inner ‘states-
of-mind,’ with the concomitant thought that those minds are already made up before 
they express themselves, it would be better to understand expressive-responsive 
movement as the embodied movement of those minds themselves. Following Merleau-
Ponty and others, some thinkers of the embodied mind have suggested that ‘expressive 
movement’ rather than representational capacity is primary to mindedness (Levin, 
2016; Sheets-Johnstone 2011). Collingwood’s own thinking of the ‘aesthetic’ as artistic 
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activity that expresses emotion, actually leaves some leeway for thinking in these terms, 
since he insists that expression is not the outward manifestation of already constituted 
states of mind, but itself the creative and imaginative manifestation of individual 
emotions from inchoate feelings (Collingwood, 1958: 109). Whilst he does not consider 
what this might mean for our appreciation of animals, having excluded our sympathy 
with life from artistic activity, other thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari insist that 
animal movement becomes expressive in various ways, such as territorial markers and 
courtship displays, and that ‘from this standpoint art is not the privilege of human 
beings.’ (2004: 349). Whether or not one is happy to call animal expressions art, it 
should be clear that the expressivity of animal movement can be fruitfully seen as 
related to artistic activity and also that the appreciation of it feeds into human artistic 
activity, as Brady (2014: 199) also notes.  
 
If the wild being of animals is open and indeterminate movement this is because of and 
not despite the imminence of movement. The unexpected is a twist on the expected, not 
the entirely capricious or chaotic.  We can then begin to see why the temporality of the 
future is so important for the rewilding imagination and also why wild animals feature 
so prominently there. The long-term ‘deep time’ future that Prior and Brady point to is 
in fact an imaginative practice that opens a space for what is not yet perceived or even 
imagined. Allowing natural growth and movement to gradually ‘take over’ is to rewild 
our own imaginative capacities. But the uncertainty of the imagined ‘deep’ future is 
only one uncertainty of the rewilding imagination and we should also appreciate the 
‘micro’ uncertainties of perception. Wild animals feature prominently here because it 
is in their expressive-responsive movements that we actually perceive wildness as 
imminence with a leeway for the unexpected. As we have seen, predation in particular 
features prominently in the appreciation of wild animal movement, from the cheetah’s 
run to the pounce of the wild cat. This is not primarily, I would suggest, because of the 
excitement of possible danger, or what Hettinger (2010: 133) describes as an 
ambiguous feeling of ‘terrible beauty’ related to the aesthetic appreciation of the tragic, 
although those feelings may play a certain role. Rather, predation is above all a 
perceptual distillation of the open experience of wildness. There are always at least two 
involved in the movement of predation, and often many more. Their expressive-
responsive movements correspond and intertwine with one another, opening a wide and 
complexly structured field of imminence. The excitement is not compressed into an 
expectation of a kill, or the functionality of kill or escape. It is the whole uncertain and 
open movement of watching, stalking, ambushing, chasing that make predation a 
distillation of animal wild being.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
I have argued that phenomenological description and analysis can contribute to debates 
in animal aesthetics, just as it has done in animal ethics and environmental philosophy 
more generally. My aim has been to show that the concern that aesthetic practices 
should seek to appreciate animals for what they are (Parsons, 2007) can be met if we 
take this to mean that we must focus on the primary ‘perceptual sense’ of animals, that 
is, their wild movement as the dynamic that makes their aesthetic qualities manifest. 
This original animate movement is both expressive and responsive, and thus open and 
indeterminate. The aesthetic side of that primary perceptual sense of open movement is 
animal wildness.  Animal wildness is appreciated in and through aesthetic practices that 
cultivate the perceptual sense of their movement. Ultimately, wild movement is not one 
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perceptual and aesthetic quality amongst others, but the basic perceptual sense through 
which the multitude of animals’ aesthetic qualities become manifest.  
 
Appreciation of the primacy of wild movement for aesthetic appreciation of animals 
leaves a number of paths open for further exploration. In the context of environmental 
aesthetics and philosophy, one of the most significant of these will be to describe and 
understand the ‘wildness’ of other elements of the natural world. The movement of the 
elements, including wind and water, and even earth and rock (e.g. as lava or shifting 
sands) has a quite different phenomenological and aesthetic character from the 
expressive-responsive movement of animals. The growth of plants, together with their 
generally unperceived movements, has another such character. Plants have begun to 
feature more prominently in philosophical discussion (Hall, 2011; Marder, 2013; 
Maher, 2017), yet this is often with a view to attributing ‘perception’, ‘mind’ or even 
‘personhood’ to them, whilst their specific aesthetic character, especially as manifest 
in lived environments intertwined with animals and the elements, has yet to be 
thoroughly examined. 
 
A second path for further inquiry would be to develop the suggestion I have made here 
that aesthetic appreciation of wild animal movement is part and parcel of artistic 
practices that both allow animal movements to follow through in their uncertain 
perceptual sense and cultivate attention to their unfolding imminence. In this sense, 
rewilding should be seen in no small part as just such a practice, or perhaps better, as a 
whole emerging tradition of such practices. More or less familiar artistic practices, such 
as photography, film-making and sound recording, together with newer and emerging 
forms of aesthetic practice that allow us to follow animals’ wild movements, can and 
should form important parts of that emerging tradition. Rewilding as an emerging 
artistic and aesthetic tradition could then be understood in contrast to all of those 
aesthetic practices, often using the same media, that have sought to capture and curtail 
the wild movement of animals in innumerable ways, and to which rewilding is at once 
an aesthetic and ethical response.  
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